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Revenue Sharing and Player Salaries in
Major League Baseball
James Richard Hill

Department of Economics, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI

Nicholas A. Jolly

Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
This article analyzes how changes made to the revenue sharing agreement in the 2007 Major League
Baseball collective bargaining agreement influenced the salaries of position players and pitchers. The tax
rates associated with revenue sharing decreased following ratification of the 2007 agreement.
Theoretically, these changes should increase players’ marginal revenue product and, therefore, salaries.
Results indicate that position players experienced an increase in salary following the 2007 agreement.
Pitchers’ salaries also increased, but by a smaller amount. The effect of the 2007 agreement was
different throughout the salary distribution for position players, but uniform throughout the distribution
for pitchers.
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Introduction
The arena of professional sports is considered the ultimate meritocracy through which productivity is
the sole determinant of salaries. Throughout history, various institutional forces arose that mitigated
true productivity-based determination of pay. The unionization among professional athletes, along with
the increased bargaining power of the athletes’ unions, is one example. The four major professional
team-based sports in the United States, basketball, football, hockey, and baseball, all have unions
representing the athletes. Today, representatives of the owners and players’ unions must negotiate any
changes made to the industrial relations system that might affect the determination of player pay.
Negotiations for free agency, salary arbitration, and the lack of a salary cap have allowed the free
market to determine Major League Baseball (MLB) player salaries more than in the other three teambased sports.
Revenue and payroll imbalances between MLB teams have increased since the early 1990s (Levin,
Mitchell, Volcker, & Will, 2000). The growing revenue and payroll inequities have come at a cost of less
competitive balance between teams. In 1999, Commissioner Allan “Bud” Selig convened the Blue Ribbon
Panel to study these inequities’ effects on competitive outcomes in MLB.1 The Panel divided teams into
payroll quartiles, with Quartile 1 containing teams with the highest payrolls and Quartile 4 containing
teams with the lowest payrolls. The 1995-1999 seasons contained 158 post-season games played. No

teams from Quartile 3 or 4 won a post-season game during this period. No teams from the bottom two
quartiles advanced to the World Series. Furthermore, each World Series champion during those five
seasons was from Quartile 1. The Panel’s report also showed that teams’ payrolls are linked directly to
revenues, that is, those teams with the highest revenues tend to be the teams with the highest payrolls.
Therefore, the Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that the growing revenue disparities lead to growing payroll
disparities, which hurt competitive balance in the league during the mid- to late 1990s. In wake of the
Panel’s report, negotiations between the owners and the MLB Players Association (MLBPA) resulted in
changes to the revenue sharing agreement starting with the 2003 season.
The revenue sharing plan negotiated in the 2003-2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) increased
the marginal tax rates associated with teams’ revenues from the 1997 CBA levels. Owners and players
agreed to these changes in the hopes of increasing competitive balance on the field. These changes did
not have the intended effects. The redistribution mechanisms associated with the revenue sharing plan
resulted in marginal tax rates equaling 40% for high-revenue teams and 47% for low-revenue teams
(Zimbalist, 2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests some teams lowered their payrolls to hold down costs.
Doing so resulted in lower attendance and revenues, which increased the funds received through
revenue sharing. Maxcy (2009) suggests that teams not only divested their player talent but also did not
compete rigorously in the talent market. This incentive to divest in talent exacerbated the competitive
inequities.
To rectify this situation, owners and players agreed to changes to the revenue sharing agreement in the
CBA covering the 2007-2011 seasons. These changes reduced the marginal tax rate to 31% for all teams
(Major League Baseball [MLB], 2006). Since representatives of the owners and players’ union agreed to
these changes to alter team incentives to invest in player talent and increase competitive balance, it is
reasonable to expect that these changes to the CBA affected players’ salaries. The differing treatments
found in these MLB CBAs offer an interesting test of labor market theory. The changes in the revenue
sharing plan amounted to a change in tax rates on marginal revenue and, therefore, the marginal
revenue product (MRP) of players. The availability of performance and salary data for MLB players allow
for a comparison between periods to see if clubs altered their valuation of players in any systematic
manner in the labor market.
To date, no study has analyzed the effect of these CBA changes on player salaries. The purpose of this
article is to examine how changes made to the CBA covering the 2007-2011 seasons altered MLB player
salaries. Using data from the 2003-2011 seasons, this article uses regression analysis to determine
whether there were changes to the determination of player pay between the pre- and post-2006 period.
In MLB, there are clear distinctions between pitchers and position players, and previous research has
shown that uniform regulations within bargaining agreements can have different effects on each group.2
The analysis estimates salary regressions separately for each group to see if modifications to the 2007
CBA differentially affected salaries.
The article proceeds by discussing the institutional background, relevant theory, and earlier literature.
The third section details the data and empirical methodology, the fourth section presents the results,
and the fifth section offers conclusions.

Institutional Considerations, Theory, and Literature
Some form of revenue sharing has always existed in MLB, and negotiations between owners and MLBPA
representatives formally introduced it into the CBA covering the 1997-2002 seasons. Under this formal
revenue sharing agreement, the marginal tax rates for high- and low-revenue teams equaled 20% and
41%, respectively (Maxcy, 2009). The Blue Ribbon Panel recommended that teams share at least 40%,
and as much as 50%, of all local revenues less stadium expenses. The provisions in the 2003 CBA called
for a two-part plan. In the base plan, teams contribute 34% of their net local revenue. The receipts from
this tax are distributed equally to all teams. Under this redistribution plan, some teams are net
recipients of funds and some are net payers. Part 2 of the plan was to distribute revenues from a central
fund. Teams that were net payers in the base plan contributed money to the central fund through a tax.
However, those teams were ineligible to receive money from the central fund. Only teams that were net
recipients from the base plan were eligible to receive revenues. The proportion received was based
upon how far below median league net local revenue the team was. Receipts from the central fund
increased as teams moved further below the median.3
The revenue sharing plan resulted in marginal tax rates that equaled approximately 40% for highrevenue clubs and 47% for low-revenue clubs (Maxcy, 2009; Zimbalist, 2003). Additionally, while teams
were supposed to use these revenues to enhance payrolls, there was no explicit requirement to do so.
Critics of the plan note that the tax structure, combined with no requirements to enhance payrolls,
created an incentive for lower revenue teams not to improve their franchise through player acquisitions
and instead to use the revenues to increase profitability.4Maxcy (2009) finds that the changes in the
2003 CBA led to greater payroll disparity and worse competitive balance. Maxcy (2009) further suggests
that some lower revenue teams divested the talent level of their rosters.
The 2007 CBA modified the two-part revenue sharing plan. The percentage of net local revenue each
team was required to contribute under the base plan was lowered from 34% to 31%. The formula for
allocation to teams from the central fund was changed and based on a performance factor. The
performance factor was determined from net local revenues from 2005 and 2006 and projected
revenues from 2007 and 2008. More importantly, the performance factors were fixed and reported in
the CBA for each team. Any team with a positive performance factor contributed to the central fund,
and any team with a negative performance factor received funds. Under this approach, a team could be
a net receiver of funds under the base plan but contribute revenues to the central fund.5 The goal of this
change to redistribution from the central fund was to correct the disincentives mentioned previously.
Under the 2007 CBA, a team’s proportion of sharing through the central fund was fixed and did not
change as revenues fluctuated. This also altered the tax structure of the revenue sharing system. Now,
all teams faced the same marginal tax rate of 31% (MLB, 2006; Zimbalist, 2006).
The amount of money transferred between teams through the revenue sharing system grew
considerably over time. Brown (2010) notes that US$433 million was transferred between clubs in 2009.
Brown (2009) published a complete list of figures for the 2003 season showing a transfer of
US$220,350,000 between paying and receiving teams. In 2009 dollars, this equals approximately
US$256.9 million, which represents a 68.5% increase in revenue sharing transfers between periods. In
nominal terms, total team revenue in MLB equaled US$3,878 million in 2003 and US$5,898 million in
2009. After adjusting the 2003 revenue figures to 2009 dollars, this represents a growth of 30.4%.
Therefore, the growth in transfers was more than double that of total league revenues. Furthermore,

revenue sharing funds represented approximately 5.7% of overall league revenue in 2003 and 7.3% in
2009 under the new plan.
Fort and Quirk (1995) and Rascher (1997) develop a model of sports leagues to examine the effects of
cross-subsidization measures (salary cap, revenue sharing, and draft) on league profits and competitive
balance. Fort and Quirk (1995) conclude that enhanced revenue sharing lowers pay by reducing the
marginal return to teams’ winning percentages. The reduction in the marginal return to a team’s
winning percentage decreases the incentive for a team to pay the same salary as before. With a
reduction in the return to winning, salaries throughout the league should be lower.
Utilizing a variation of Fort and Quirk’s (1995) model, Marburger (1997) finds that increased revenue
sharing can improve competitive balance but agrees that enhanced revenue sharing reduces player
salaries. In Marburger’s (1997) model, enhanced revenue sharing reduces player salaries through a
reduction in the MRP associated with a given stock of talent. Unlike Fort and Quirk (1995), Marburger
(1997) shows that it is possible for revenue sharing to increase the MRP for smaller market teams and
decrease it for large market teams. However, the large market team’s reduction will outweigh the
increase experienced by the smaller market clubs, thereby reducing salaries league-wide. Cavagnac
(2009) removes the assumption that teams are price takers in the market for players and agrees with
Marburger (1997) that competitive balance can be improved by increased revenue sharing; Cavagnac’s
(2009) model finds a decrease in the value of talent at the margin and lower salaries.
Fort and Quirk (1995), Marburger (1997), and Cavagnac (2009) assume that the team’s objective is to
maximize profits. Profit maximization leads to teams paying their players a salary equal to their MRP.
Vrooman (2009) alters the basic model and assumes that owners maximize wins. The author assumes
that season length and zero profits constrain team owners, which leads to teams paying their players a
salary equal to their average revenue product. Using this win-maximizing model, Vrooman (2009)
concludes that increased revenue sharing can improve competitive balance and increase payrolls. The
author provides some transient evidence suggesting that all four team-based sports leagues in the
United States are moving toward the win-maximizing assumption.
Rascher (1997) and Dietl, Grossman, and Lang (2011) develop a utility maximization model for owners in
which profits and winning enter directly into the objective function. Rascher (1997) shows that under
the assumption of pure profit maximization, increased revenue sharing leads to lower wages for the
same reason as Fort and Quirk (1995). When profits and winning enter the objective function, revenue
sharing’s effect on wages is ambiguous. Teams with relatively low talent levels may bring the wage
down, while highly talented teams could push the wage higher. On net, however, the author notes that
revenue sharing’s effect on wages is most likely negative. Dietl et al. (2011) note that if the effect of
competitive balance on teams’ revenue is sufficiently large, then revenue sharing causes a positive
impact on player MRP. This increases the investment in player talent and, therefore, salaries. The
authors label this the “sharpening effect.” The authors do examine the opposite case, the “dulling
effect,” whereby the contribution of competitive balance to a team’s revenue is sufficiently small to lead
to revenue sharing reducing a player’s MRP and, therefore, salary.
Maxcy (2009) is the only article empirically examining MLB’s revenue sharing agreement on competitive
balance. The author finds that the changes in the 2003 CBA led to greater payroll disparity and worse
competitive balance. Maxcy (2009) further suggests that some lower revenue teams divested the talent
level of their rosters. Additionally, Zimbalist (2010) presents some descriptive evidence suggesting that

the increased marginal tax rates associated with the 2003 CBA may be responsible for the lower share of
total player compensation as a percentage of league revenues. This empirical evidence supports the
theoretical conclusions developed by Fort and Quirk (1995), Rascher (1997), Marburger (1997), and
Cavagnac (2009) and the dulling effect discussed in Dietl et al. (2011). Combined, these empirical and
theoretical findings suggest that the reduced marginal tax rates and the equalization of marginal tax
rates across teams in the revenue sharing agreement in the 2007 CBA should increase player salaries by
increasing net MRP. The simplified theoretical model assuming profit maximization of team owners
discussed by Maxcy (2009) highlights this. Define MRPi to equal player i’s MRP and define τk to equal the
marginal tax rate associated with team k as defined in the CBA. In equilibrium, player i’s salary, w,
should equal the after-tax MRP:
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 ). (1)

A reduction in the marginal tax rate should increase net MRP and, therefore, salary. Furthermore, since
all teams experienced a reduction in the marginal tax rate after 2006, salaries should, on average,
increase league-wide.

Maxcy’s (2009) model has additional implications. Define τ to equal the marginal tax rate in 2007. Based
on Equation 1, player i’s salary in 2007 would equal 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (1 − 𝑡𝑡). If Equation 1 represents a
player’s salary for a given period before 2007, then the percentage change in salary experienced by the
player would equal:
%∆𝑊𝑊 =

(𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 −𝑡𝑡)
.
(1−𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 )

(2)

Using the marginal tax rates referenced in Zimbalist (2003) and Maxcy (2009), Equation 2 suggests that a
player’s salary should increase between 15% and 30%. Furthermore, players on teams subject to higher
initial marginal tax rates should experience larger wage growth when compared to those players on
teams subject to smaller initial marginal tax rates. In other words, salary growth may be larger for those
who play for lower revenue/smaller market teams.6

Data and Methodology
The analysis sample includes players on the opening day rosters reported by USA Today from the period
2003-2011. Teams have a flexible roster size, which ranges from 25 to 40 players. The 25-player roster
represents the team limit from opening day through the end of August. During this time, however, the
team can have 40 players signed to major league contracts. Teams assign those not on the 25-player
rosters to minor league affiliates of the major league franchises. Beginning in September, rosters expand
from 25 to 40 to allow younger players the opportunity to gain major league experience. This study uses
data on salaries and statistics of players on the opening day roster to maintain consistency with previous
research on factors affecting overall pay inequities in MLB (Jewell, McPherson, & Molina, 2004). Data on
salaries come from the USA Today salaries databases (all dollar amounts have been converted to real
figures by dividing by the appropriate year’s consumer price index for all urban consumers with
1982/1984 = 100); player and team statistics come from Doug’s National Basketball Association (NBA)
and MLB statistics; and data on team revenue come from Rodney Fort’s database.7
The overall goal of revenue sharing is to increase the competitive balance between teams. The purpose
of this article is to analyze how this change to the 2007 CBA affected the salaries of players. To this end,

the analysis estimates salary regressions by ordinary least squares (OLS). The general form of the
estimated equation is:8
ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥 ′ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1 +𝑧𝑧 ′ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3post − 2006 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇 + 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (3)

In Equation 3, yit is the real salary of player i in period t, xit is a vector of time-varying player statistics, zit
is a vector of time-varying team variables, T is a time trend, and cj is a set of club fixed effects.9 The main
variable of interest, post-2006, is a dummy variable equaling 1 for years 2007 onward and 0 otherwise.
Finally, uit is an error term.
Sports researchers understand that there is a large degree of heterogeneity between position players
and pitchers, particularly since position players potentially play in more games. Therefore, the 2007 CBA
may have disproportionate effects on these two groups. Equation 3 is estimated separately for position
players and pitchers. When the sample includes position players, the variables contained in xit include
experience and experience squared, on-base percentage, slugging percentage, games played, and
dummy variables for the player’s main position. When the sample contains pitchers, on-base
percentage, slugging percentage, games played, and position dummies are replaced by earned run
average and strikeout-to-walk ratio. Those variables contained in zit include the team’s winning
percentage, real revenue (measured in millions of dollars), and a dummy variable equaling 1 if the team
is in the National League.

Results
Table 1 presents averages of the main variables used in the analysis. The first column shows the
variables, Column 2 shows the statistics calculated prior to 2007, and the final column contains the
measures calculated after 2006. There are not many differences in the performance measures of either
position players or pitchers between the two periods. Players tend to have slightly less experience after
2006. Additionally, position players have a somewhat lower on-base percentage and slugging
percentage, and pitchers have a lower earned run average and a higher strikeout-to-walk ratio. Large
differences between periods do exist when examining average salaries and team revenue. The average
position player’s salary increases approximately 7.8% between the two periods, whereas average
pitcher salary increases 11.5% after 2006. Furthermore, average team revenue is 17.9% higher in the
latter period. The increase in player salaries between periods is not as large as the increase in team
revenues. Zimbalist (2010) notes how high competitive balance tax rates, in addition to clubs having to
pay significant minor league player costs, lead to revenues increasing at faster rates when compared to
player pay in MLB.

Tables 2 and 3 present results from Equation 3 for position players and pitchers, respectively. The first
column displays the independent variables used. Columns 2–7 present the regression results based
upon estimating Equation 3 using different subsamples of the data. The subsamples differ by the player
observations used (indicated by the row labeled “Sample”). Focusing on Model 1 in Table 2, the
parameter estimate associated with the post-2006 dummy variable indicates that the 2007 CBA tended
to increase significantly position player salaries by 19.7%, on average.10

Models 2 and 3 restrict the observations used based upon years of experience. In MLB, players with
fewer than 3 years of service time are ineligible for either free agency or final offer salary arbitration.
Those with between 3 and 5 years of service qualify for salary arbitration; however, not all players file
for arbitration. Players with 6 or more years of service qualify for free agency. The market determines
salaries received by free agent players. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the 2007 CBA had
differing effects on players with different years of experience. Model 2 presents results after limiting
player observations to those with at least 6 years of experience, and Model 3 restricts observations to
those players with no more than 5 years of service. The 2007 CBA had a relatively larger effect on
players who qualify for free agency. The 2007 CBA increased salaries for free agent eligible players by
23% versus 17% for nonfree agent eligibles. While these estimates are not statistically different, they
represent economically large differences in salary. From 2003 to 2006, the average salary of players with
at least 6 years of experience is US$2.4 million; the average for those with less than 6 years of
experience is approximately US$530,000. Using these as a baseline, the parameter estimate in Model 2
suggests an increase in salary for free agent eligible players equaling US$554,911, and the increase for
nonfree agent eligible players suggested by Model 3 is US$88,858.
Models 1–3 include all player-year observations in the estimation. For those players who sign multiyear
contracts, including all observations, may introduce a nonindependence problem in the estimation.11 To
try to account for this, Models 4–6 limit the number of observations included for each player. Models 4
and 5 only include a maximum of two observations per player, the first and the last. Model 5 differs
from Model 4 in that Model 5 requires that the player’s first observation occurs before 2007, and the
last observation occurs in 2007 or later. Finally, Model 6 only includes one randomly chosen observation
per player. In each case, the parameter estimate associated with the post-2006 dummy variable is
positive, indicating a positive impact from the 2007 CBA on salary. The estimate is statistically significant
in Models 4 and 5.
Results in Table 3 for pitchers are slightly different when compared to those for position players.12
Model 1 indicates that the 2007 CBA increased salaries for pitchers by 8.7%.13 While this is smaller in
magnitude than the result for position players, the estimates are not statistically different. However, the
estimate for pitchers is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, the results represent
economically large effects. Using the average salaries for position players and pitchers in the 2003-2006

period in Table 1 and the coefficients associated with the post-2006 dummy variable from Model 1 in
Tables 2 and 3, the implied increase in salary for position players equals US$303,353. The implied
increase for pitchers is US$103,926. In fact, the only result that shows a strongly significant effect of the
2007 CBA on pitcher salaries is that in Model 2 for free agent eligible players. In whole, the results in
Table 3 provide only some evidence of the 2007 CBA positively affecting pitcher salaries.14
Many variables included in Equation 3 exhibit a high degree of collinearity. For example, the correlation
coefficient between on-base percentage and slugging percentage equals .77. It is possible that
multicollinearity among the independent variables drives the main results presented in Tables 2 and 3.
To investigate this, versions of Equation 3 were reestimated using the full set of player observations by
sequentially adding and subtracting variables. The magnitude of the coefficient associated with the post2006 variable remained relatively stable throughout these additional regressions (available upon
request), which suggests that collinearity among the independent variables does not drive the main
findings in Tables 2 and 3.
Using OLS to estimate Equation 3 yields evidence as to how changes made to the 2007 CBA affected the
conditional mean of the salary distribution. Specifically, the purpose of the modified revenue sharing
agreement is to allow teams with relatively lower payrolls and revenues to use the additional funds to
attract, retain, and develop higher quality players to improve competitive balance. Therefore, the 2007
CBA may have differing effects on players throughout the salary distribution. To this end, the general
form of Equation 3 was reestimated using quantile regression techniques and the full set of player
observations. One advantage that quantile regression has over OLS is that outlying observations have a
smaller influence on estimates of the conditional quantile when compared to the conditional mean,
which should aid in reducing heteroscedasticity in the distribution. An additional advantage of using
quantile regression techniques over OLS is that estimating conditional quantiles provides a more
complete picture of how players throughout the distribution can be affected differentially. The results of
this estimation are provided in Tables 4 and 5 for position players and pitchers, respectively.

Results in Table 4 for position players suggest that the 2007 CBA’s effect on salaries is not uniform
throughout the distribution. The parameter estimate associated with the post-2006 variable grows
when moving from the tails to the center of the distribution, with the largest estimate occurring for
those players in the 40th percentile. In fact, the coefficient associated with the 90th percentile is not
statistically significant. Tests were conducted to see whether each coefficient for the other percentiles is
statistically different from that for the 40th percentile. Results indicate that the coefficient associated
with the post-2006 variable for the 10th percentile is statistically different at the 5% level, and the
coefficients associated with the 20th and 90th percentiles are different at the 10% level. This provides
statistical evidence that the 2007 CBA had a larger effect on position player salaries in the middle of the
distribution when compared to those in the tails. Given that owners and union representatives must
agree on changes made to a CBA, these results lend support to the median voter model, suggesting that
modifications made to the 2007 CBA were designed to aid those position players in the middle of the
distribution.
Results in Table 5 suggest a different story for pitchers. As before, the parameter estimates associated
with the post-2006 dummy variable are relatively smaller at each percentile for pitchers than for
position players. Additionally, it seems as though the 2007 CBA’s effect on pitcher salaries is
concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. The coefficient is statistically significant only at the 10th,
20th, and 30th percentiles, and it is only significant at the 10% level at the 30th percentile. To maintain
consistency with the analysis for position players, tests were conducted again to see whether each
coefficient for the other percentiles is statistically different from that for the 40th percentile. Again, the
results for pitchers are different from those for position players. None of the coefficients associated with
the post-2006 dummy variable are statistically different from the coefficients for those pitchers at the
40th percentile. This suggests that while the parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 10th,
20th, and 30th percentiles, there is no differential effect of the 2007 CBA on pitcher salaries throughout
the distribution.
Using the tax rates referenced by Zimbalist (2003) and Maxcy (2009), Equation 2 predicts a player’s
salary should increase between 15% and 30%. Equation 2 inherently assumes that a player’s quality (or
relative league quality) remains unchanged between the pre- and post-2006 period. Almost all of the
results in Tables 2 and 4 for position players lie within the bounds provided by Equation 2. The only
result that falls outside the bounds occurs in Model 5 of Table 2. However, the sample used in that
analysis was very restricted (only two observations per player, one before 2007 and one after 2006). The
results for pitchers, however, do not fall in line with the predictions from Equation 2. Only Models 2 and

5 in Table 3 show coefficients associated with the post-2006 variable that lie within the predicted
bounds.
In MLB, there are clear distinctions between pitchers and position players. The above results suggest
that uniform regulations within bargaining agreements can have different effects on each group. When
compared to pitchers, particularly those on a team’s starting rotation, position players generally play in
significantly more games. Differences in the amount of playing time may lead to differences in the MRP
between the two types of players. This is not the first article to suggest differential impacts of MLB
policies on pitchers versus position players. Hill and Spellman (1983) find significantly higher estimated
increases in compensation for position players versus pitchers due to the introduction of free agency in
1977. Hill and Jolly (2014) find that position players who file for final offer salary arbitration experience a
larger increase in salary when compared to pitchers. Furthermore, those position players who exchange
offers with their teams experience a salary premium, whereas no premium exists for pitchers who
exchange salary offers with their teams.
Even though revenue sharing’s effect on salaries is larger, generally, for position players than for
pitchers, the results in Tables 4 and 5 do suggest a common theme—changes to the revenue sharing
plan enacted by MLB in the 2007 CBA benefitted mostly players in the middle to lower half of the salary
distribution in both cases. The 2007 CBAs effect is largest for position players in the 30th–60th
percentiles, which lends support for the median voter model. For pitchers, the coefficients associated
with the post-2006 dummy variable are statistically insignificant for the 40th–90th percentiles. As
mentioned above, there is little evidence of statistically significant differences between the coefficients
associated with the post-2006 variable across the pitcher quantile regressions. However, these results
are, qualitatively speaking, in line with the predictions from Equation 2. In other words, those playing for
smaller revenue/market teams (which typically pay lower salaries, on average) tend to receive larger pay
increases than those

Conclusions
The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of changes made to the 2007 CBA on player salaries.
The key change made to the operation of MLB from the 2003 to the 2007 CBAs occurred with the
revenue sharing agreement. Specifically, the 2007 CBA reduced the marginal tax rate associated with
revenue sharing and eliminated its regressive nature. Theoretically, these changes should increase
players’ MRP and, therefore, salary.
Using a similar methodology to Jewell, McPherson, and Molina (2004), results suggest that the 2007 CBA
increased position player salaries by 19.7%, on average. The result was relatively robust to various
sample selection criteria. The 2007 CBA had differential effects on players throughout the distribution,
however, with the largest impact occurring in the center of the distribution. The impact of the 2007 CBA
on pitcher salaries is somewhat lower, 8.7% on average. Furthermore, there is little evidence suggesting
that the effect differs throughout the pitcher salary distribution.
The change to the revenue sharing agreement in the 2007 CBA represented a dramatic attempt to
improve competitive balance in MLB. Between 1998 and 1999, the NBA and the National Basketball
Players Association agreed to similarly large changes to their CBA. Specifically, the NBA and players’
union agreed to a cap on individual player salaries, a new exception to the team salary cap, an extension
of the rookie scale agreement from 3 to 4 years, lower rookie scale salaries, and minimum pay scales

based upon years of experience.15 Changes to the NBA CBA altered player pay by institutionalizing it
through maximum payouts and minimum increases. The MLB CBA changed revenue sharing between
franchises in the hopes of incentivizing teams to invest in players and, therefore, change salaries. The
MLBPA has steadfastly resisted any owner overtures for team- or individual-level salary caps. Because of
this resistance, baseball has the most market-driven salaries of the four major professional team-based
sports in the United States. Comparing MLB to the NBA allows for an understanding as to how different
unions trying to reach a compromise in collective bargaining negotiations can affect salaries.
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Notes
1.The panel’s independent members included Paul Volcker, George Will, Richard Levin, and George J.
Mitchell. The Panel’s report can be found at
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf.
2.For an example focusing on final offer salary arbitration, see Hill and Jolly (2014).
3.See Basic Agreement (2002), Zimbalist (2003, 2006), and Maxcy (2009) for more specific details.
4.See “Pirates’ books reveal flaw in revenue-sharing” by Rob Biertempfel and Bob Cohn (2010) or “MLBs
Revenue-Sharing Formula” by David Jacobson (2008).
5.See Basic Agreement (2006) and Zimbalist (2006) for more detail.
6.This result assumes that the relative quality of the player is the same in the period before and after
the change in the tax rate.
7.The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for the USA Today Web site is
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/salaries/index.htm. The URL for Doug’s statistics is
http://www.dougstats.com. The URL for Rodney Fort’s database is
https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes.
8.Jewell, McPherson, and Molina (2004) use a similar estimated equation. The authors estimate the
determinants of within-team Gini coefficients throughout the 1990s. Since this article is
interested in salaries throughout the league, instead of at the team level, the analysis uses a
similar estimated equation for individual player salaries.
9.The salary figures do not include any incentive bonuses earned.
10.The exact percentage change comes from e β ˆ −1 eβ^−1 .
11.It is worth noting that the standard errors in Models 1—3 are robust and clustered at the player
level. This should account for some of this nonindependence.

12.The parameter estimate associated with the National League (NL) dummy variable warrants some
discussion. For position players, the results of Model 1 in Table 2 suggest that NL position
players earn approximately 15% less than comparable American League (AL) position players do.
Simple averages from the data support this claim. Position players in the AL earned, on average,
US$1,744,779. Players in the NL earned US$1,480,632, which is approximately 15% less. The
coefficient associated with the NL dummy variable in the pitcher regression (Model 1 in Table 3),
however, is misleading. The coefficient indicates that NL pitchers earn 36% less than AL pitchers
do. This is due to multicollinearity in the pitcher regressions. The NL dummy variable is highly
correlated with the team fixed effects. When removing the team dummies and reestimating
Equation 3 for pitchers, the coefficient associated with the NL dummy variable equals −0.034,
and it is statistically insignificant. This implies that NL pitchers earn approximately 3.3% less than
AL pitchers do, on average. Simple averages from the data set support this number. The average
AL pitcher salary equals US$1,288,251, and the average NL pitcher salary is US$1,270,779, which
is 1.4% lower.
13.It is possible that changes to the revenue sharing plan in the 2007 CBA affected not only pay on
average but also the return to various performance metrics, such as slugging percentage for
position players or earned run average for pitchers. To investigate this, interaction terms
between the post-2006 dummy variable and each variable in xit were created. These interactions
were then used in Equation 3 for both position players and pitchers. Results from these
regressions show that the coefficients associated with the post-2006 dummy variable and each
of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Therefore, it appears that the revenue
sharing agreement in the 2007 CBA had only a level effect on log salary and did not affect the
returns to each of the performance metrics used here.
14.Team owners and MLBPA representatives did agree to other changes between the 2003 and 2007
CBAs, and these may have affected players’ salaries. It is important to note that the post-2006
variable may pick up these other changes. However, most of the alterations to the 2007 CBA
were minor when compared to the changes made to revenue sharing. One potential example is
the change made to the competitive balance tax. The competitive balance tax rates did not
change from the 2003 to the 2007 CBAs. However, the 2003 CBA provided some exceptions
allowing teams to have payrolls exceed the payroll threshold and pay no tax. The 2007 CBA
eliminated these tax loopholes. All teams are affected by changes made to the revenue sharing
agreement, while only four teams were subject to the competitive balance tax during the
sample period here. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the revenue sharing agreement
had a larger effect on teams than did the changes to the competitive balance tax. Arguably,
while only four teams explicitly paid the competitive balance tax, removing tax loopholes could
raise the implicit competitive balance tax rate. Theoretical models developed by Fort and Quirk
(1995) and Marburger (1997) show that increases in the implicit tax rate associated with the
competitive balance tax should reduce players’ MRP and, therefore, salaries. The post-2006
variable would pick up this effect. The results presented here generally show an increase in
salary associated with the 2007 CBA. This provides evidence that the changes made to the
revenue sharing agreement had a relatively larger effect on salaries when compared to the
competitive balance tax.
15.For a detailed discussion of the various changes made to the NBA CBA, see Hill and Jolly (2012).
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